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 The U.S. social policy framework has always relied on private employers to fill in the 
gaps for workers, rather than the state. U.S. workers have neither a strong social safety net 
outside of the labor market, nor an extensive social welfare structure supporting the labor 
market. For the most part, adequate provision of social benefits depends critically on employers’ 
voluntary adoption of support policies. For example, the U.S. has neither a universal health plan 
nor a requirement that employers provide health insurance coverage; the U.S. public system of 
old-age pensions is work-based, and that public system falls short unless supplemented by 
additional (voluntary) employer contributions. This system largely marginalizes low earners, 
people of color and immigrant populations, and those unable to work or irregularly attached to 
the labor market, but also leaves much of the middle class vulnerable to cut-backs by their 
employers. 
 This model is failing. Over the past generation, employers have increasingly pushed the 
burden of economic risks associated with illness, unemployment, or old age onto individuals and 
the state has not stepped in to cover those risks, exacerbating social exclusion. This trend has 
been offset by only a handful of countervailing factors, which been insufficient to change the 
overall course. While employers have maintained generous benefit packages for a privileged 
few, they have reduced employment benefits for most. Because of the centrality of employer-
provided benefits and the absence or limited presence of broader government provision, this has 
significantly weakened economic security for most. 
This paper will start by discussing at some length the U.S. system of work-based social 
supports, how it has changed, and the consequences for workers.  In the following section we 
briefly analyze the political and economic forces that have driven these changes, as well as 
counterforces that can help to build a better system of supports.  We close with brief reflections 
on promising policy directions.  
 Those particularly interested in policy implications may wish to skip directly to the final 
section, “Rebuilding a social support system for workers and their families.”  In that section, we 
argue that there are several key elements to a program to spread risk and reconstitute social 
support: shoring up social insurance programs, enhancing employee voice in the workplace, and 
designing policies that emphasize inclusion, connect economic security to other urgent economic 
issues, and where appropriate start at the state or even local level to set the stage for broader 
reforms. 
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 In today’s changed political landscape, the time is ripe to take bold strides in rebuilding 
the US social support system, beefing up workplace-based elements as well as developing 
socially provided supplements.  At the outset, however, we want to emphasize two critical 
points.  The first is that to deepen inclusion, it is essential to strive for universality, pushing back 
against the political pressures to exclude particular groups, such as employees of smaller 
businesses.  The second is that given many Americans’ by now reflexive distrust of government, 
it is necessary to find creative ways to make the case for policies that will indeed expand 
government regulatory and transfer activities.  Our goal with this paper is to help make that case. 
 
The U.S. system of social protection for workers and how it has 
changed 
The U.S. system does not include a basic government-provided set of supports for 
families to help them mitigate the economic risks of illness, unemployment, or change in family 
structure (such as divorce or a new child). Because the U.S. does not provide universal health 
insurance, nearly one-in-six residents of the country lack health insurance coverage (DeNavas-
Walt, Proctor and Smith 2007). Most of those without coverage are children, but in addition, 
nearly one-third of workers who earn less than $20,000 a year have no health insurance coverage 
of any kind (Employee Benefit Research Institute 2006, Figure 17). Except in the state of 
California, and soon Washington and New Jersey, U.S. workers do not have the right to paid 
family leave or sick leave, in no place do workers have the right to vacation time, and part-time 
workers are more often than not denied employment-based benefits. In an era when most 
families had stay-at-home wives, this was far from ideal, but not a disaster. Now, with families 
having little flexibility in terms of someone to provide care, this packs a double punch.  
Given that 70 percent of families do not have a stay-at-home parent, another gap with 
serious consequences is that the U.S. has no national system of child care. Private child care 
costs are high, especially for the care of young children. In 2002, U.S. families in the bottom 40th 
percentile or below who paid for formal daycare spent nearly one-fifth of their family total 
income on child care, compared to only 6 percent among families in the highest quintile 
(Boushey and Wright 2004). There are some government child care subsidies available to low-
income parents but recent research finds that across 10 states, less than 25 percent of eligible 
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children are served by these subsidies (Albelda, et al. 2007). The United States spends less than 
one half of one percent of its budget on child care programs. 
The countervailing trend is that while the state has pulled back from supporting non-
working poor families, there has been some shift toward supporting the income of the “working 
poor,” low-income families with at least one worker. In the mid-1990s, the U.S. Congress passed 
and President Clinton signed welfare reform, which effectively eliminated income supports for 
non-working, able-bodied adults, even if they have small children at home. Meanwhile, the two 
most important policy changes since welfare reform, the expansion of the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) and the introduction of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), 
focus on extending benefits to low-income working families. The end of government-provided 
income for low-income parents left some families in desperate straits, but arguably the extension 
of other benefits has left many of the poorest families better off than before. However, these 
expansions, while important, were limited at best. While some of the poorest working families 
gained, most low-income families with a worker remain ineligible for work supports and many 
of those eligible do not actually receive benefits (Albelda, et al. 2007). 
Simultaneously, social exclusion has advanced through the rapid and sustained increase 
in income inequality. Over the past thirty years, even though U.S. families have increased their 
hours of labor force participation, average earnings per hour of work have stagnated, and 
earnings inequality has grown. As a result, families have experienced slower growth in family 
incomes, and widening family income inequality. As a result of slower income growth and 
widening inequality, more families feel an economic squeeze. Whereas a generation ago, most 
U.S. families could afford to have a stay-at-home parent--most often, the mother--today’s 
families cannot afford to have a non-working parent. In 2006, over 70 percent of children grow 
up in families without a stay-at-home parent.1
                                               
1 Authors’ analysis of U.S. Census Bureau , Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplements, 
Tables F14, F13, F10, and FINC03. 
 At the same time, costs for basics, like health care, 
housing, and child care, have increased far faster than inflation, putting them out of reach for 
many families. Thus, while most U.S. families can afford a television or DVD player, which can 
easily cost less than $100, many cannot afford the upwards of $300 to $1,000 per month 
necessary to pay for health insurance coverage and health care expenses.  
www.census.gov 
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But it wasn’t always this way: a comparison of the U.S. social protection system in the 
early 1970s and today is enlightening. The most important fact is what has not changed: social 
supports were and continue to be primarily employment-based. But there also have been 
significant changes in recent decades. Government transfers have been sharply reduced. As 
regards employment-based benefits themselves, some elements have been added or strengthened, 
but others weakened, leaving a system that is, at best, inadequate and very uneven in its impact. 
 We start with a general description of the social protection system, emphasizing 
components that have not changed over the years. Then we turn to the things that have changed. 
It is important to stress that the U.S. system is a federal system, meaning that responsibility for 
setting rules, administering programs, and paying for them is shared between the federal 
(national) government and the 50 state governments. In some cases, program changes have 
shifted responsibilities between levels of government. 
 
Core elements of the worker-protection system 
The foundation of U.S. employment and social policy was established during the 1930s. 
This core set of components was amended—most often enhanced—through the early 1970s, and 
has remained fairly similar since then. This core includes a limited set of regulations and a 
somewhat more expansive set of public-private benefits. The key labor regulations are minimum 
wage and overtime pay provisions first enacted in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, while 
the cornerstone of public-private work-based benefits is the Social Security Act of 1935, which 
established Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, commonly as “Social Security.” There 
are a small handful of programs to assist workers who cannot work for some reason 
(unemployment, illness, or caring for a family member). Other elements of the worker-protection 
system, such as health insurance, pensions, and paid time off, are employer-based. 
 
Worker rights 
The basic U.S. labor standards are set out in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 
which when implemented, aimed to improve job quality as well as encourage business to create 
more jobs rather than demanding more hours of current employees. Originally, the FLSA 
excluded some groups of workers, but was extended from the 1940s through the 1980s to include 
almost every worker except for employees of state and local government, small farms, and some 
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domestic workers (U.S. Department of Labor 2007a). Congress initially set the minimum wage 
at about half of the median hourly wage. As of 1970, the minimum wage stood at 43 percent of 
the median hourly wage (calculated by authors from U.S. Department of Labor 2007b and U.S. 
Council of Economic Advisors 2007 Table B-47). The overtime provision pay provision of the 
law requires employers to pay employees 150 percent of their normal wage for any hours above 
40 worked in one week.  
 
Health insurance 
 Most employed workers access health insurance through an employer, either theirs or a 
family member’s. In 2005, 75 percent of those under age 65 receiving health insurance received 
it either from their own employer or a family member’s (calculated by authors from Employee 
Benefit Research Institute 2006). However, the U.S. health insurance system does include health 
insurance coverage for some workers: 1965 legislation also established Medicaid, which 
provides health insurance to very poor families that are viewed as less capable of work (very 
poor adults, children, and the disabled). Only 13 percent of the under-65 population received 
Medicaid in 2005 (Employee Benefit Research Institute 2006). 
 
Paid time off  
Beyond compensation in the case of long-term disability, the U.S. system does not 
include a right to paid sick days (except in San Francisco and the District of Columbia), paid 
holidays, or paid vacation. Some employers offer these benefits, but like other employer-based 
benefits, they are offered primarily to higher-wage workers. 
• In 2006, just over half (57 percent) of private sector workers had access to paid sick days 
from their employer, about the same as had it in 1979 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2006). Higher-paid workers are much more likely to have access to this benefit: in 1999, 
38 percent of blue-collar and service employees had access to paid sick days, compared 
to 81 percent of professional and technical employees and 59 percent clerical and sales 
employees (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2001).  
• If a worker does have paid sick days from their employer, they usually cover only the 
worker’s own illness, not that of family members who may need their care: nearly two-
thirds (63 percent) of workers (both full-time and part-time) do not have access to paid 
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sick leave to care for a sick child (Lovell 2004). The share of employees without paid 
sick leave for a child’s illness rises to 84 percent in construction and non-durable 
manufacturing and 94 percent in accommodations and food services, an industry that 
disproportionately employs women. 
• In 2006, employers reported providing seventy-six percent of workers with paid holidays, 
and 77 percent received paid vacation (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2007a). Among 
those who received these benefits, the average was eight holiday days per year and nine 
vacation days per year, rising to 16 days after ten years (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2007b).  
 
Non-employed workers 
The most important source of support for non-employed workers is a private benefit: the 
private pensions and retirement accounts that support large numbers of retirees.  However, 
federal and state laws have supplemented this source with a variety of publicly mandated or 
provided benefits.  The Social Security Act (SSA) is a social insurance program that provides 
income in retirement to workers and their dependents and, as of the 1970s, a program for the 
disabled. Its primary program is a pension paid out of current workers’ contributions (a “pay-as-
you-go” system), designed to supplement private pensions. Eligibility for the pension depends on 
a history of employment and payment into the system by the recipient or his/her spouse. Most 
Americans are eligible: in 2006, 93 percent of persons aged 65 and older received Social 
Security (Employee Benefit Research Institute 2007, Chapter 7, Table 7.2). The contribution end 
of the system is regressive, because the tax only applies to earned income up to a fixed 
maximum, but the distribution end is progressive, repaying more to low earners relative to their 
contributions (Dollars & Sense 1988). Persons over 65 who are entitled to Social Security 
retirement benefits through their work history are also entitled to the Medicare health insurance 
program, established in 1965 (U.S. Social Security Administration 2007a). Although much of the 
Social Security Act applies to workers and their dependents, in 1972, the federal government 
established in addition a Supplementary Security Income (SSI) program targeted to disabled 
and blind people regardless of work history (U.S. Social Security Administration 2007b). 
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Some—but by no means most—workers who become unemployed, disabled, either 
temporarily or permanently, or caring for a family member may be eligible for state assistance 
through one of three programs:. 
• Unemployment Insurance, which is administered by the states according to federal 
guidelines. This program generally exclude new labor market entrants and people who 
have quit or been fired for cause. Currently, about 40 percent of unemployed workers 
receive benefits. 
• Each state has a mandatory Workers’ Compensation insurance program. These 
programs began  in the early 1900s (American Association of State Compensation 
Insurance Funds 2007).  
• Five states also have mandatory Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) programs. In 
two states, California and New Jersey, the TDI program has been expanded to include 
family leaves (caring for a new child or ill family member), not just individual disability 
and Washington has set up a stand-alone program for paid parental leave. 
Like Social Security, these three sets of programs are insurance-like, since workers’ income risks 
are pooled and payments into the system (i.e. insurance premia) are made based on expected 
benefit. If a worker meets certain eligibility requirements (such as a minimum duration of 
employment, sufficient earnings and a qualifying job separation), she is eligible to receive 
benefits from these programs regardless of wealth or non-wage income. The structure of these 
programs links eligibility to work effort and is reserved for those workers with regular 
employment. Finally, the funds for these programs come from specific taxes on employment 
ultimately paid by workers, rather than general revenues paid by the whole population. The 
unemployment and disability insurance programs aid small subsets of the population: in 2006, 
less than three percent of the over-15 population received unemployment insurance, and another 
three percent received Workers’ Compensation or SSI (U.S. Census Bureau 2007).  
 
Changes in the work-based core 
 Numerous changes have rocked the U.S. system of social support since the early 1970s. 
We group these changes into changes in the core work-based elements, and modifications of 
non-work-based support—some of which introduced new work requirements into supports 
originally designed for non-working populations. 
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Core work-based supports are generally weaker than they were several decades ago. The 
wage floor provided by the minimum wage has fallen (though recent legislation has boosted it). 
Employer-provided pensions and health insurance are far less generous than they once were, and 
political challenges threaten the public pension (Social Security) and elderly health insurance 
(Medicare) systems. Cutting in the other direction is the establishment, for the first time, of a 
right to unpaid family leave from work for the birth of a child or the illness of a family member 
to about half the labor force. On net, these changes have weakened the core set of work-based 
rights and benefits, shifting increased economic risks onto workers and their families.  
 
Here is a breakdown of the major changes to the work-based core since the 1970s: 
 
Fair Labor Standards Act 
• Because the federal minimum wage is not tied to the inflation rate, it falls in real value 
over time unless Congress moves to increase it. Beginning in the 1980s, Congress 
stopped moving to increase the nominal minimum wage. In 2006, the purchasing power 
of the federal minimum wage stood at 45 percent below its 1968 level, and equivalent to 
only 31 percent of the median wage (Figure 1).  
• In response to flaws in the federal minimum wage system, most states (and some cities) 
have adopted state minimum wage laws: currently 30 states require minimum wages 
above the federal level (U.S. Department of Labor 2007c). In 2007, the U.S. Congress 
finally passed legislation to raise the federal minimum wage to $7.25 by mid-2009, but 
this only partially restores the loss in purchasing power (not shown in Figure 4).  
• Federal regulatory changes in 2004 reduced the reach of the overtime pay provisions by 
greatly expanding the definition of “executive, administrative, and professional” workers, 
who are exempted from the requirement of a 50 percent higher wage for hours worked 
beyond 40 in a given week. These changes removed an estimated eight million workers 
(about six percent of the total employed workforce) from eligibility for overtime pay 
(Eisenbrey and Bernstein 2003; estimate calculated before the changes went into effect). 
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Social Security and Medicare 
Social Security and Medicare are enormously popular, in part because of their near-
universality. To undermine support for these programs, neoliberal politicians have adopted two 
lines of attack. One is to claim that the systems are unaffordable, especially given the impending 
retirement of the “baby boom” generation (born 1945-60). It is true that the ratio of elders to 
working-age adults has risen, and will rise significantly more in coming years. Nonetheless, the 
full dependency ratio (the ratio of elders and children to working-age adults) has changed little 
(Dollars & Sense 1988). Further, the Social Security system is not projected to run out of funds 
until the middle of this century; the real crisis is in the rapidly rising medical costs (Baker and 
Weisbrot 1999). Still, those setting the political agenda in the country have focused attention on 
the insufficiency of current revenue sources to cover projected benefit payments, rather than 
discussing the possibility of expanding revenue from other sources. The second line of attack has 
been to attempt to begin privatizing the system, shifting control from the national government to 
private insurers and financial institutions, with the aim of getting individual workers—rather 
than the federal government—to shoulder the risks involved. 
 The results of these debates have differed for Social Security and Medicare:  
• Social Security pension benefits have been modestly trimmed, notably by 1983 
legislation increasing the penalty in benefit levels for early retirement (before 65) and 
gradually increasing the age for full benefit eligibility to 67 (U.S. Social Security 
Administration 2007c). In 2006, the average Social Security benefit was less than 
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$12,000 a year, out of a total average retirement income of close to $27,000 (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2007). However, when the George W. Bush administration attempted in 2005 to 
introduce and subsidize private individual retirement accounts as an option within the 
Social Security system, Congress refused to approve the initiative.  
• Medicare has consistently expanded (U.S. Social Security Administration 2007a), but in 
2005, a privatizing proposal to incorporate and subsidize private insurers within 
Medicare, packaged with an expansion of prescription drug benefits, was adopted by 
Congress (Krugman 2005).  
 
Employer-based benefits: pensions and health insurance 
 Relatively small changes in public pensions and health insurance contrast with sea-
changes in their private counterparts, which push the risks of retirement planning and health care 
onto individuals, rather than employers. For the past thirty years, U.S. employers have massively 
shifted from defined-benefit to defined-contribution retirement plans. A defined-benefit plan is 
one where the employer commits to a set payment for the life of the retiree, which is usually 
adjusted annual for inflation. A defined-contribution plan is one where the employer commits to 
a certain level of financial contributions to an employee’s retirement saving account. The 
employee is then responsible for managing the allocation of that account among stocks, bonds, 
and cash. Employees with defined-contribution plans are not entitled to a set payment during 
retirement and their benefit payment will not necessarily rise with inflation.  
Defined-benefit plans tumbled from covering 84 percent of full-time workers holding 
pensions in 1980 to 33 percent in 2003. Thus, employers have essentially shifted the risk of 
retirement savings and planning onto workers. At the same time, the overall proportion of U.S. 
workers covered by any retirement plan dropped, from 91 percent of full-time employees in 1985 
to 65 percent in 2003 (Employee Benefit Research Institute 2007, Chapter 10, Table 10.1a). Due 
to a combination of reduced pension coverage and smaller employer contributions, employer 
pension contributions as a percentage of total compensation, which had soared from 1 percent in 
1948 to 4 percent in 1977, dropped back to 2 percent in 1990, though the percentage has 
fluctuated since (Price 2005).  Specific groups are particularly disadvantaged by these changes.  
As shown in Table 1, while over half of native-born workers have access to pension coverage, 
little more than one-third of immigrant workers do.  Those less attached to the labor force are, 
 11 
not surprisingly, also far less likely to obtain pension benefits: as annual hours of work fall 
below 1500, pension coverage drops precipitously. 
 
Table 1: Pension and health insurance coverage in 2006, by immigration status and annual 
hours of work 
Worker 
characteristics 
% with pension 
coverage from own 
employer 
% with health 
coverage from own 
employer 
% with private 
health coverage from 
any source 
All employed 51.7% 53.0% 76.2% 
     
By immigration status    
Born outside US 36.2% 42.4% 58.3% 
Born inside US 55.1% 55.4% 80.1% 
     
By total annual hours 
of work in 2006* 
 
  
0 hours (never 
employed) 0.0% 8.6% 46.0% 
1-500 26.7% 11.1% 66.9% 
501-1000 31.0% 16.9% 65.6% 
1001-1500 38.2% 27.1% 65.9% 
1501+ 56.2% 62.7% 79.7% 
Source: Authors’ analysis of March 2007 Current Population Survey data 
*Full-time, year-round work (52 weeks x 40 hours) is 2080 hours 
 
Over the same period, employers retreated from providing—and paying for—employee 
health insurance, both for employees and employee’s families. The percentage of workers 
covered by an employer-provided health plan declined from 69 percent in 1979 to 56 percent in 
2004 (Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto 2007, Table 3.12). Once more, immigrants and those 
with fewer annual hours of work were less likely to receive private health insurance from an 
employer—or indeed from any source (Table 1).  The largest gaps in employer-provided health 
insurance are by an individual’s employment-related characteristics (though there are also 
significant gaps by race, ethnicity, and age). Historically, employers provided health insurance 
not only to their own employees, but their employees’ spouse and children. However, this is 
increasingly not the case and low-wage workers have been hit hard by declining health insurance 
coverage for dependents. Among low-wage workers, less than half (44 percent) have employer-
provided health insurance from either their own employer or a family member’s, compared to 
nine-out-of-ten (89 percent) high-wage workers. Workers in small firms are also less likely to 
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have employer-provided health insurance from either their own employer or a family member’s 
(63 percent), compared to workers employed in large firms (76 percent). Thus, many low-wage 
workers and those working in small firms who do not get employer-provided health insurance 
from their own employer do not make up this lack of coverage by being covered on a family 
member’s employer plan (Boushey and Wright 2004). Employers also shifted the cost of health 
insurance onto employees. Whereas in the 1970s employers typically paid the full cost of health 
insurance premia, by 1985 35 percent of employees contributed to the premium for individual 
coverage, and that percentage climbed to 76 percent in 2005 (Employee Benefit Research 
Institute 1985, Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto 2007 Table 3.13). Again, lower-wage workers, 
along with women and racial minorities, were more likely to have to contribute to the premium. 
Employers also added deductibles and co-payments that require employees to pay some of the 
costs of health care directly rather than relying completely on the insurance. 
 
Family leave 
As the government and employers cut back many of the core work-based protections and 
benefits, government did add one important new workplace-based benefit. Since 1993, over half 
of U.S. workers have had access to unpaid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA). FMLA provides up to 12 weeks of job-protected leave to workers when they have a 
new child or they or a family member has a serious illness. Yet, because this leave is unpaid 
(except in California and soon Washington and New Jersey), many who need it cannot afford to 
take it. Among those who needed leave, but did not take it, nearly two-thirds reported that the 
reason was that they could not afford to take unpaid leave (Commission on Leave 1996). 
Although some employers exceed the law by offering paid family leave, their numbers are 
shrinking.  According to a study by the Work and Families Institute, the percentage of employers 
offering paid childbirth leave has fallen from 27 percent in 1998 to 16 percent in 2008, and the 
average length of allowed childbirth leaves has decreased (Shellenbarger 2008). 
While we focus here on pecuniary benefits, it is worth mentioning here that a number of 
other work protections have also eroded over time.  Notably, enforcement of occupational safety 
and health, anti-discrimination, and labor representation laws have weakened (see Bernhardt, 
Boushey, Dresser, and Tilly 2008 for more discussion). 
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Reductions in non-work-based benefits and the addition of new work-based 
benefits 
 While core work protections and benefits continued to decline over the 1990s, two other 
changes complicated the picture. On the one hand, the federal government and states sharply 
reduced non-work-based benefits, weakening a critical component of the safety net. On the other 
hand, they added or expanded some new government-provided, work-based benefits.  
 
Welfare reform 
In 1996, the U.S. Congress passed, and President Clinton signed, the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, commonly known as “welfare 
reform.” “Welfare,” in this case, refers to the former Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) program, established in 1935, which principally supported single mothers of dependent 
children. The landmark 1996 legislation replaced AFDC with a much-reduced Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program, focusing on moving families from welfare into 
self-sufficiency as quickly as possible. Building on an accumulation of state work requirements, 
time limits, and other restrictions on AFDC benefits, this legislation signaled the end of the 
government’s willingness to provide cash assistance to able-bodied adults, regardless of their 
status as parents or caretakers. Congress imposed a five-year lifetime limit on the receipt of cash 
assistance, a requirement that 50 percent of welfare recipients had to participate in work by 2002, 
and a reduction in the ability of welfare recipients to be in school while on welfare. Further, 
Congress changed the program from one where everyone who was eligible was guaranteed 
assistance to a block grant, which gives more discretion to the states to cap eligibility and 
determine how to best spend public assistance funds. During the 1990s, the states also phased out 
or greatly reduced General Assistance programs, the income support program of last resort for 
able-bodied adults without dependent children. 
In a less-noticed change that actually generated most of the savings in the reform, 
Congress excluded many legal non-citizen immigrants who have entered the United States after 
1996 from federally funded TANF, Medicaid health insurance, Food Stamps, and SSI disability 
programs for a five-year period after entry, and empowers states to place further restrictions on 
transfers to immigrants after the five-year period (though states may also use their own funds to 
aid immigrants and some state restrictions have been pared back since 1996) (Tumlin and 
Zimmerman 2003).  
 14 
 
New work-based benefits  
At around the same time, the U.S. Congress also expanded already-existing or new 
programs—often known in the U.S. as “work supports”—to increase the benefits going to low-
income, working families:  
• In 1996, Congress increased the value of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), a tax 
credit for low-income workers with families. 
• The 1996 welfare reform legislation consolidated child care assistance and increased 
funding for child care under the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF).  
• In 1997, Congress expanded low-income children’s access to health insurance through 
Medicaid by implementing the State Child Health Insurance Program (SCHIP).  
The end result was that due to the expansion of funding for Medicaid, SCHIP, CCDF, the EITC, 
and the Child Tax Credit, low-income families received nine times more assistance in 1999 than 
in 1984, as federal spending rose from $5.6 to $51.7 billion (in constant 1999 dollars) 
(Congressional Budget Office 1998, Sawhill and Haskins 2002). While this increase is small 
compared to the long-term losses in real wage levels experienced by low-wage families, it 
represented a significant boost to low-income working families. The key shortcomings of this 
policy shift are its failure to extend support to those just above very low-income cutoffs and the 
fact that federal and state governments, after increasing spending in the late 1990s, retrenched it 
in the 2000s. 
The EITC and SCHIP, the largest pieces of this package of supports, merit further 
explanation. The EITC is one of the only major work supports specifically designed to support 
low-income families with workers. It was established as part of the federal personal income tax 
code in 1975. When enacted, federal policy makers recognized that families with low-wage 
workers, such as single mothers and families whose adult members are disabled or taking care of 
members with disabilities, need some support. Significantly, the EITC provides a refundable tax 
credit, meaning that the lowest-income families can receive a credit exceeding their total tax 
liability—in essence, cash support from the government. While the EITC provides a fairly 
significant tax credit, above $3,000 for families who receive the maximum, and most of those 
eligible actually receive the benefit (Albelda, et al. 2007), the credit phases out rather quickly 
with increasing income.  
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Medicaid was not designed to provide health insurance coverage to workers, even if they 
are not offered (or cannot afford) employment-based health insurance. The goal of the 1997 
expansion of Medicaid through SCHIP was to “to provide funds to States to enable them to 
initiate and expand the provision of child health assistance to uninsured, low-income children in 
an effective and efficient manner that is coordinated with other sources of health benefits 
coverage for children.” This program provides health coverage for children of the working poor 
(typically families with incomes somewhere between 100 and 200 percent of poverty), but not 
their parents. One-in-seven children (14 percent in 2002) and 6 percent of adults under age 65 
are covered by Medicaid or the State Child Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) (Boushey and 
Wright 2004). However, low income limits for eligibility for the program cause many working 
families to be excluded from the program, even though they still may not be able to obtain health 
services through employer- or self-provided insurance and recent research finds that many of 
those eligible for Medicaid/SCHIP do not actually access benefits (Albelda, et al. 2007). 
 
Income trends and increasing social exclusion 
 The net result of these changes in social supports is the creation of a two-tiered social 
policy—which does not meet the needs of a three-tiered workforce. While the social safety net 
provides work supports to the very poor and employers provide them for the upper and middle 
classes, neither provides for a third tier, the working poor. In short, the way our social policy 
system works, most low-wage workers are too rich for public supports, but too poor to afford 
these goods and services on their wages. The lack of an adequate safety net for low-wage, 
working parents threatens their ability to stay employed and move up the job ladder, as well as 
their ability to parent effectively. 
The gaps in U.S. social policy would be of less concern if incomes were rising 
significantly across the income distribution. In that case, low-income workers would see 
increases in their buying power, allowing them to afford to purchase benefits even if they did not 
receive them from state or employer. In addition, growing numbers of workers would “graduate” 
into the upper tier of jobs with employer-provided benefits.  
But in the past three decades, U.S. economic growth has generally benefited only those at 
the very top of the income ladder, rather than the broad working class. An analysis by 
economists Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez summarizes these harsh income disparities. 
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They found that despite several periods of healthy growth between 1973 and 2005, the average 
income of all but the top ten percent of the income ladder—nine out of ten American families—
fell by 11 percent when adjusted for inflation (Piketty and Saez 2007). Yet, the economy—as 
measured by gross domestic product (GDP)—has grown by over 160 percent since 1973. This is 
only slightly less than the period from 1947 to 1973 when GDP grew by 176 percent. That’s 
come as Americans have become much more productive—productivity has grown by over 80 
percent since 1973—meaning it now takes fewer workers to produce the same number of 
widgets as it did in the past (Baker 2007).  
 In a healthy economy, that growth is shared between workers and investors and wages 
should rise with productivity. This was the case in the decades between World War II and the 
early 1970s, when productivity and median wages both increased by an average of two to three 
percent every year. But since 1973, productivity has increased sharply, especially since the mid-
1990s, but median wage growth has been flat and inequality has grown. Since 1973, the bottom 
fifth of families have seen their income fall by an average of 0.2 percent per year, while the 
bottom 40 percent have seen no growth at all. At the same time, the top fifth of families have 
seen their income rise by 1.1 percent per year. The growth in inequality abated—but did not 
reverse course—during the high employment years of the late 1990s. Since the recession of the 
early 2000s, however, inequality has begun to grow again. Since 2000, families in the top fifth of 
the economic ladder enjoyed a small income boost of 1 percent—the only families to see any 
growth—while those in the bottom fifth lost nearly 5 percent (DeNavas-Walt, et al. 2007). 
 Trends in health care coverage have followed a similar pattern, even in the years since the 
government’s creation of SCHIP and the extension of publicly-provided Medicaid to low 
earners. During the most recent economic recovery, inequalities in access to health insurance 
continued to grow. The share of the population without health insurance is now at nearly 16 
percent, an all-time high (DeNavas-Walt, et al. 2007). For the most part, this is the result of a 
continuing decline in employer-provided health insurance. Between 2000 and 2006, the share of 
U.S. children and the share of adults with employment-based health insurance both fell by about 
6 percent. Since most adults are ineligible for Medicaid, they are now swelling the ranks of the 
uninsured, while, mostly because of the SCHIP expansion, the share of children with government 
health insurance rose by close to 7 percent between 2000 and 2006. Yet, even with the SCHIP 
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expansion, there are more children without health insurance: From 2005 to 2006, the share of 
uninsured children stepped up from 10.9 percent to 11.7 percent (Boushey 2007).   
 
What has driven the changes? 
 We have outlined recent changes in both the U.S. social support system and the overall 
distribution of income and work-related benefits. Here we go on to suggest that a set of linked 
attacks on the working class underlie both sets of changes. A powerful political coalition, which 
ironically has been able to incorporate a large section of the working class, has promoted policies 
that intensify these attacks. However, significant counter-forces to this anti-worker offensive are 
beginning to build. 
 
A three-part attack on the working class 
 Elites in the United States have, since the 1970s, undertaken a three-fold assault on the 
working class. The first prong has been business attempts to drive down (in real terms) private 
compensation and shift economic risk from employers to workers. Employers went on the 
offensive against unions, with the result that the share of U.S. workers in unions has fallen 
sharply over the past half century. In 1948, almost one-in-three workers was in a union; by 2005, 
the fraction had fallen to just one-in-eight (Schmitt and Zipperer 2007). Declining unionization 
has been particularly acute in the private sector, compared to the public sector. This indicates 
that decline in private-sector representation may have more to do with behavior of private-sector 
employers than preferences of American workers, and indeed as of 2005 a majority of non-union 
workers expressed a preference for union representation (Freeman and Rogers 2006, Exhibit I.6).  
 The employer behavior in question is concerted, illegal anti-union activity. Recent 
research has found that almost one-in-five union organizers or activists can expect to be fired as 
a result of their activities in a union election campaign. There has been a steep rise in the 2000s 
relative to the last half of the 1990s in illegal firings of pro-union workers. By 2005, pro-union 
workers involved in union election campaigns faced about a 1.8 percent chance of being illegally 
fired during the course of the (Schmitt and Zipperer 2007). Moreover, employers to threaten to 
close all or part of the business in more than half of all union organizing campaigns, and unions 
win only 38 percent of representation elections when such threats are made, compared to 51 
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percent in the absence of shutdown threats (Bronfenbrenner 2000). Both firings of union 
supporters and threats to close the plant violate the National Labor Relations Act. 
 With unions on the defensive and reduced to a small corner of the private sector, 
employers have had a relatively free hand to contain or even reduce wages and curtail insurance 
benefits in non-union settings with little fear of union organizing. As a result, the gap between 
union and non-union compensation yawns wide. Full-time workers who are union members earn 
30 percent more per week than their non-union counterparts (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2007c). Seventy percent of union workers have defined-benefit pension plans; only 15 percent of 
nonunion workers do (Labor Research Association 2006).  
 In a second line of attack, businesses pressed elected officials to adopt neoliberal policies, 
shifting the state away from support of labor. The restaurant and retail industries led the drive to 
reduce the real value of the minimum wage, lowering the floor under private sector wages (Tilly 
2005). On the public sector side, the 1975 New York City fiscal crisis marked a turning point: 
financial institutions holding city debt demanded and won wage freezes and layoffs of city 
employees as well as cutbacks in city services, heralding widespread efforts to undermine the 
power of public employees by tough bargaining, subcontracting, and privatization of government 
services (Harvey 2007). Beginning with President Reagan in 1981, Republican presidents 
making appointments to the National Labor Relations Board, which makes rulings on allowable 
labor relations practices by businesses and unions, began to choose board members more 
opposed to unions, creating an ever less favorable terrain for union representation (Miller 2006, 
Moberg 1998). Even federal training programs evolved, from the Comprehensive Employment 
and Training Act of 1973, which paid the unemployed to perform public service jobs in nonprofit 
organizations, through the Job Training Partnership Act of 1983, which ended paid public 
service jobs and instead funded a variety of training programs for those most in need, to the 
Workforce Investment Act of 1998, which, for the most part, reduced workforce development 
services to pushing the unemployed to accept any job available (O’Leary, Straits, and Wandner 
2004). 
 Another important aspect of neoliberal policy has been the adoption of “free trade” 
agreements—in most cases designed primarily to facilitate capital investment abroad on 
advantageous terms—with few protections for labor rights. Most importantly, in 1993, President 
Clinton signed into law the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which created a 
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trade area between Canada, the United States, and Mexico. Unlike the European Union, NAFTA 
does not establish readiness criteria before poorer countries could be admitted, nor did it allow 
for meaningful transfer of development funds (Anderson and Cavanagh 2004). This meant that 
NAFTA was implemented without any meaningful or enforceable requirements for Mexico to 
enforce international labor, social or environmental standards. Moreover, investor rights and 
other provisions gave additional incentives for firms to relocate to Mexico to take advantage of a 
weaker labor and regulatory environment (Bottari and Wallach 2005). In addition to the loss of 
manufacturing jobs associated with the rise in the ballooning U.S. trade deficit with NAFTA 
countries (Bivens 2006), NAFTA led to a climate where U.S. firms could increasingly squash 
wage and collective bargaining demands and bargaining by invoking the threat of moving abroad 
(Bronfenbrenner 1997, 2000). (Meanwhile, Mexican workers and farmers failed to realize 
expected economic benefits as U.S. imports ravaged Mexican agriculture and the maquiladora 
export assembly plants never developed economic linkages to the broader Mexican economy 
[Scott, Salas, and Campbell 2006].) Estimates based on Krugman’s seminal trade work during 
the 1980s and 90s show that pre-NAFTA trade liberalization dating from the 1970s accounts for 
40 percent or more of the observed increase in U.S. inequality. Krugman now says trade in the 
post-NAFTA period is even “a bigger factor than it was” in explaining inequality trends 
(Krugman 2007; Baker and Weisbrot 2001; Cline 1997 p.264). 
 The third wing of the assault on worker’s standard of living came through attempts to 
reduce the social wage, which we discussed above. The “welfare reform” of 1996, which 
essentially ended government financial support for non-working single mothers, marked the 
culmination of a long series of state and federal restrictions and benefit reductions of welfare 
programs through the 1980s and early 1990s. Attempts to curtail the Social Security and 
Medicare programs providing support for the elderly have so far been less successful. 
 
The alliance behind the attacks, and the counter-forces 
 The coalition driving the anti-working class offensive was led by business associations 
and pro-business conservatives allied with anti-government libertarians. Grover Norquist, leader 
of Americans for Tax Reform, famously declared, “My goal is to cut government in half in 
twenty-five years, to get it down to the size where we can drown it in the bathtub” (Dreyfuss 
2001). Of course, the downsizing of government was one-sided, since at the same time that the 
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social role of government was being scaled down, the penal system and the military were 
expanded (Western and Beckett 1999). 
 A coalition of elites is not sufficient to maintain hegemony in a democratic society. The 
neoliberal alliance succeeded by drawing in broad sections of the working class via two 
rhetorical and strategic devices. The first was to lead with anti-government ideology, harnessing 
racism (and the widespread view among whites that “big government” had primarily benefited 
racial minorities, including immigrants), resentment by struggling workers of non-workers 
receiving government aid, and widespread distrust of government, and contrasting government 
with the traditional American value of individual initiative and advancement, exemplified by 
George W. Bush’s espousal of an “ownership society” to justify privatization of Social Security 
(Block 2006). The second stratagem linked economic liberalism with social conservatism, 
mobilizing conservatives with issues such as abortion, undocumented immigration, and 
homosexuality (Frank 2005, Tilly 1999). Both strategies, while centered in the Republican Party, 
were able to enlist much support from Democrats as well. 
 The cornerstone of the coalition was tax-cutting (Miller 1997, 2001, 2004). Conservatives 
launched the tax-cutting agenda in 1979 with California’s Proposition 13, a voter referendum in 
which real estate interests organized home-owners to vote to cut property taxes. As in this case, 
Congress from the 1980s through the 2000s repeatedly enacted tax reductions that primarily 
benefited the wealthy and large businesses, in the name of tax relief for “ordinary families.”  
 The “market fundamentalist” agenda always faced opposition, with its core in unions, 
big-city populations, and the social democratic wing of the Democratic Party. Pro-working class 
forces have been able to win selective victories by attracting broader support on certain issues. 
They have tapped widespread support for universal programs for the elderly, such as Social 
Security and Medicare. They have also been able to build significant political support for aid to 
children, as exemplified by the creation of the SCHIP health insurance program. The U.S. public 
believes that workers deserve a decent wage, and campaigns for a higher minimum wage—
locally, at the state level, and nationally—have attracted broad public support as well (Tilly 
2005). As conservative columnist Ramesh Ponnoru recently remarked, “The public does not 
agree with us on [the minimum wage] issue; never has. Opposition to a higher minimum wage is, 
for many people, explicable only in terms of greed and heartlessness” (Ponnoru 2007). The rapid 
growth of health care costs has led some businesses to form unaccustomed alliances for reform 
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of the U.S. health care system: in February 2007 Wal-Mart, AT&T, and Kelly Services (the 
largest temporary help agency in the country) joined forces with the Service Employees 
International Union and the Communication Workers of America in a coalition calling for 
affordable health coverage for everybody in the nation (Muy and Russakoff 2007). 
 Amplifying the impact of these political victories has been outrage at the federal 
government’s failure to provide adequate relief after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck the Gulf 
Coast of the United States in August 2005, and shock at the collapse of a highway bridge in 
Minnesota in August 2007 that highlighted the extent to which government has failed to invest in 
necessary infrastructure upgrading. As a result, public opinion has swung back toward endorsing 
the need for government to support low-wage workers and invest in social spending. In a recent 
poll, nearly one-third of Republican voters supported “tax increases on the most affluent 
Americans to help reduce the federal deficit and to pay for expanding health care programs to 
cover the uninsured” (Hart/Newhouse 2007). These shifts, along with the unpopularity of the war 
in Iraq, allowed the Democratic Party to recapture majorities in both houses of Congress in 2006 
(Judis and Teixeira 2007). 
 The summer-fall 2007 debate over the reauthorization of SCHIP, the new State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program, provides one window into the state of the debate. As noted 
above, the purpose of SCHIP was to fill in the gap in access to health care for the millions of 
children living in families where the parents work, but employers have abdicated responsibility 
to provide health insurance coverage. The SCHIP bill was immensely popular, but when it had to 
be reauthorized in 2007, the President refused to sign into law a bill that expanded SCHIP’s 
reach. The U.S. Congress voted to raise SCHIP funding levels both to enable states to sustain 
existing children’s enrollment and to cover more low-income children. The agreement provided 
financial incentives to states to enroll more uninsured children who are already eligible for 
Medicaid or SCHIP. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that by 2012, a total of 3.8 
million children who otherwise would be uninsured would have had health care coverage under 
this bill (Congressional Budget Office 2007). This bill was supported by a wide range of 
healthcare providers, advocates, and state-level policymakers, including the American Medical 
Association and governors of both political parties. The bill passed both houses of Congress, but 
President Bush vetoed it, denouncing the expansion as a “step toward [the Democrats’] goal of 
government-run health care for every American” (Pasternak 2007).  
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 The SCHIP confrontation, which pitted President Bush against public sentiment and even 
against many members of his own party, illustrates the growing popularity of social spending 
and the waning power of anti-”big government” rhetoric to derail social legislation. Nonetheless, 
there are significant limits to legislative and public approval for a stronger social safety net and 
more robust institutions to support job quality. The progressive coalition has rallied support for a 
continued or strengthened social wage for children and the elderly, but has not been able to 
extend that support to adults of working age. Ironically, the Earned Income Tax Credit, the most 
significant expansion of government-provided cash support to low-income working-age adults in 
recent decades, has gained backing in part appearing to be nothing more than a tax cut. Another 
key limit is that Americans continue to see unions as a narrow special-interest group. Unless a 
pro-working class coalition can challenge such limitations, the U.S. system of social supports is 
likely to remain impoverished. 
 
Rebuilding a social support system for workers and their families: 
What does economic security mean?  
 The U.S. social support system is a failure. The decades since the 1970s have seen 
growing divergence of wages, incomes, and access to benefits such as adequate pensions and 
health insurance. The American two-tiered system of support provides generous, employer-
provided benefits for the affluent and limited (and sometimes temporary) but important support 
for the lowest-wage workers. However, it offers little to the great bulk of low-income workers, 
and even “middle class” workers—such as the auto workers at General Motors—who have 
traditionally enjoyed adequate employer-provided benefits, are seeing those benefits scaled back 
with no alternative source of support in sight. Inequality in incomes, as well as access to benefits, 
like health insurance and pensions, has exacerbated social exclusion in the United States. 
The principal thrust of changes in employer practices and public policy over the past 
decades has been to shift economic risks onto workers (Hacker 2006). The costs of 
unemployment, illness, retirement, and raising a family are increasingly dealt with by individual 
workers and their families, rather than socialized through insurance schemes. As fewer workers 
have access to defined-benefit pensions, most now must take on the risk of designing their own 
retirement plan and saving adequate funds. Families who have a child must cope with the full 
economic cost of this decision – from having to take unpaid time from work to care for that 
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child, to having to pay the full costs of infant and toddler care, which research shows is less 
subsidized and typically more expensive than sending a child to a state university.  Workers and 
their families have increasingly become responsible for their own health care costs, with the 
partial exception of the relatively small slice of families benefiting from SCHIP.  Women, people 
of color, immigrants, and those less firmly attached to the labor force are most likely to be left 
more exposed.  
Economic security should include attention to asset development, but the past few years 
have shown that there are clear risks to relying on this strategy alone. Over the past decade, 
workers who have invested their retirement in the stock market were hard hit by the 2000 stock 
market crash, but that will likely pale in comparison to the losses – especially for low-income, 
female-headed, minority and immigrant families – in investments in homes. Home prices fell an 
average of 14 percent from March 2007 to March 2008, reaching an annualized rate of decline of 
25 percent in the first quarter of 2008, and falling prices are affecting lower-cost homes the most 
(Baker 2008). 
 A new social support system must focus on ensuring that illness, childbirth, old age, and 
unemployment are not conditions that throw families into destitution. It cannot rely on individual 
savings. If we learn anything from the bubbles, financial crises, and inflation in recent years, it 
should be that workers cannot control the macro-economy and thus relying on asset development 
to smooth economic risk can be a risky strategy. 
We do not aim here to lay out a complete new blueprint for economic security.  However, 
we do wish to point out some of the promising directions where progress toward sharing risk and 
broadening economic inclusion seems likely to be possible in the short to medium run.   
 
Strengthening social insurance 
 Insurance schemes are the easiest, most cost effective way to spread risk, both across 
individuals, but also across the lifespan.  The current political environment offers several 
opportunities to expand insurance, reducing working people’s economic vulnerability. In all 
cases, these are problems that other developed nations solved decades ago; while U.S. audiences 
usually think that what happens in Europe is irrelevant, policymakers and advocates can learn 
from the experiences of other countries in thinking through these proposals. 
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• Health insurance.  States have already begun to move on this issue, notably 
Massachusetts with its adoption of a universal mandate for health insurance—imperfect, 
but a step in the right direction. The presidential campaign has highlighted the 
widespread desire for a comprehensive, national system of health insurance to replace the 
current threadbare patchwork. Both Sen. McCain and Sen. Obama have made access to 
health insurance key parts of their platforms and it is likely that the 111th Congress will 
look into this issue, so we should be prepared for a national debate.  
• Paid family leave.  Three states have already passed some form of family leave insurance 
by establishing an insurance scheme to cover workers taking leave under the Family and 
Medical Leave Act to care for a family member or recover from an illness and many 
others are considering such policies. There are bills pending in both the House and the 
Senate that would create a national Family Leave Insurance system, and the 110th 
Congress will soon vote on paid parental leave for federal workers as a first step. 
Supporting these campaigns at the federal and state level is key to helping families cope 
with the risks associated with the lack of a stay-at-home parent. 
• Pensions.  With regard to pensions, there is not the same energy for broad reform as in 
the case of health care.  However, one promising prospect is to increase pension 
portability as Washington and West Virginia are doing, reducing the economic liabilities 
associated with job change. While Social Security reform was on the Bush 
Administration’s agenda, it’s not likely to be a first priority of either a McCain or Obama 
Administration, but retirement security will likely continue to be important at the state 
level. 
• Paid sick days.  Paid sick days are a basic labor standard in nearly every other nation and 
are a limited form of insurance against economic costs associated with illness.  Proposals 
to require a minimum level of paid sick leave are gaining traction in a number of states 
and have already passed in San Francisco and the District of Columbia. Legislation is 
pending in Congress, as well as a number of states, and this issue is likely to remain on 
both the federal and state agenda. 
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Increasing worker voice 
 At the level of the workplace and at the level of society, greater worker voice and 
representation weigh on the side of stronger security and expanded inclusion.  In the US 
institutional environment, the key institutions for such voice are unions.  But as noted above, 
employers violate the current National Labor Relations Act with impunity, stalling union 
organizing and flouting the intention of the law.  The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) would 
remedy this impasse by streamlining the process of gaining union representation (granting unions 
representation rights once a majority of employees have indicated their preference for a union, 
without requiring the public election campaigns that create opportunities for illegal employer 
intimidation).  Although this reform would not directly address problems of risk-shifting and 
exclusion, the indirect effects could be enormous.  EFCA passed the House in 2007, but have not 
yet come up for a vote in the Senate. Winning the EFCA will be difficult due to nearly 
unanimous business opposition (Weil 2008), but if 2008 brings a continuation of the political 
realignment of 2006 and more pro-labor Senators, there will be an opening for change.  
 
Inclusion, linkage, and federalism 
 Achieving significant reforms will depend on designing good programs, but also crafting 
compelling political arguments and putting together coalitions strong enough to achieve change.  
Three principles that help to do both are inclusion, linkage, and federalism. 
• By inclusion, we mean leveling the playing field by extending existing benefits to those 
who are currently excluded.  One of the great successes of the minimum wage policy is 
that it applies to all but a small handful of employers. Many other policies, however, 
exclude small businesses. The FMLA, for example, only covers about half of U.S. 
workers, with the other 50 percent excluded because their employer is too small (fewer 
than 50 employees). While this compromise was the cost of passing the original 
legislation in Congress, it perversely cuts out those most in need of protection, 
contributing to the multi-tiered nature of employment-based supports (Boushey and 
Schmitt, 2007).  Other criteria—such as job tenure requirements—also may unnecessarily 
exclude low-wage, young, or part-time workers.  Inclusion addresses the central problem 
head-on.  It also undergirds a compelling argument for reform, as demonstrated by the 
effectiveness of the “CheneyCare” ad campaign by the California Nurses Association 
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(2008), which characterizes universal care as simply extending the Vice President’s plan 
to the rest of the population. 
• By linkage, we mean incorporating job quality concerns into other relevant legislation.  
Living wage laws have been tremendously successful in linking job quality criteria to 
municipal contracting and expenditures of public funds.  The current political 
environment offers important footholds for linkage.  Two current areas of legislation that 
afford this opportunity are “green jobs” programs—the point is not just to look at the 
number of jobs, but whether they are adequate jobs—and any future attempts at fiscal 
stimulus. 
• By federalism, we mean keeping a sharp eye out for what levels of government are most 
willing and able to move forward on particular issues.  Ultimately, the goal should be an 
adequate national system of social protection, and the shift of national sentiment toward a 
larger federal government role in such protection offers hope for some national-level 
reforms.  But as the examples listed above highlight, states and in some cases even 
localities have moved first on health insurance, pension portability, paid sick days, and 
temporary disability insurance and are doing so in ways that incorporate inclusiveness 
and linkage.  State and local initiatives that incorporate the themes of inclusion and 
linkage should be one focus of our work, while at the same time recognizing that winning 
national-level reforms will require a separate effort.  
 
 In short, there are important opportunities to help insulate working families from 
economic risk, while simultaneously expanding social and economic inclusion. This would 
require that we focus our efforts on policies that are universal and do not capitulate to carve-outs 
for particular groups if this in any way excludes those at the bottom of the economic ladder or 
the more needy of that particular program. It also will require creative thinking outside the box to 
find ways to push this agenda in after decades of cut-backs by employers. Americans have little 
faith that government can solve their problems; the way to change that is to show them what 
government does that is good and demonstrate how we can affect economic outcomes. The end 
result would be a significantly stronger system of social support—still work-based in many 
ways, but far more inclusive.  These changes would represent a dramatic step forward for the 
most disadvantaged American workers.   
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